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Rationale for the Symposium
Few intellectuals and political analysts have dominated their times 
more than Raymond Aron His death in fall 1983 elicited press notice from 
around the globe Aron’s writings, covering over fifty years of ceaseless 
productivity, reached every corner of the world He was truly a scholar 
and teacher of global proportions Often at odds with his contemporaries 
m  Europe, he was perhaps more appreciated, if not always fully understood, 
by his English-speaking peers m  the United States and England than by his 
French and European colleagues Yet he was too formidable to be ignored or 
dismissed by his adversaries and too original and iconoclastic to be cast 
as the representative of any one school of politics or political analysis
Aron’s death, coming shortly on the heels of the publication of his 
best-selling memoirs,^ prompted the editors of the International Studies 
Quarterly to attempt an evaluation of his contribution to the study and 
understanding of international relations This project has several related 
aims First of all it seeks to identify some of the principal elements of 
Aron’s work and approach to international politics that merit attention and 
preservation Second, the editors sought to present a critical
* As the guest editor of this Aron retrospective, I should like to take 
this opportunity to thank Professor Terence Hopmann and Robert Kudrle for 
their unfailing aid and encouragement Professor Hopmann translated Pierre 
Hassner's article and was ever diligent and sensitive m  capturing the 
meaning of illusive phrases and in pursuing fugitive citations Professor 
Kudrle*s persistence and gentle suasion were indispensable in seeing the 
project to completion
2retrospective rather than a eulogy, which, while well meaning, would have 
had little lasting value It seemed important to determine, at least m  a 
preliminary way, what of Aron's work is likely to stand the test of time 
It was also felt that Aron, given his dedication to dialectical discourse 
would have also preferred a probing retrospective that looked critically 
and skeptically at his writing
Three respected scholars m  international relations, known to 
colleagues on both sides of the Atlantic, consented to contribute 
evaluations A close reading of the articles by Pierre Hassner, Stanley 
Hoffmann, and Urs Luterbacher reveals that they do not share the same views 
about Aron's contribution to the study of politics Indeed, Professor 
Luterbacher, while conceding the importance of Aron's earlier philosophical 
writings, advances the intriguing case that Aron and his contemporaries 
slowed the development in France of a scientific social science along the 
model of the physical sciences
The differences expressed in the following retrospective suggest the 
third aim of the project, viz , to stir debate about key conceptual and 
methodological problems in international relations that have not been fully 
resolved Aron strove throughout his career to bridge the gulf between the 
imperatives of disciplinary rigor and the demands of relevance imposed on 
the practitioner What could be a better tribute to Aron than to 
acknowledge his ability, even after his death, to provoke debate about ways 
to cross that divide
Even a focused evaluation of Aron's work, confined to his 
contributions to international relations, must necessarily be partial and 
circumscribed First, this corpus is too complex and extensive to admit to
3neat categorization or easy summary It draws on a broad range of 
disciplines and professions, including history, philosophy, sociology, and 
economics These writings speak to varied audiences within different 
contexts of time and circumstance at several levels of analysis on a wide 
array of topics of theoretical and applied import No cursory 
retrospective could hope to do justice to the man or his work
Second, in many ways Aron's work Aron the observer Aron eschewed 
a purely academic or scholarly career, although he held a chair 
professorship in sociology Since his college years m  the 1920s, he was 
personally engaged in the philosophical and political issues of his time 
He was a publicist for the Free French m  England and a respected, if 
controversial, editorialist throughout the postwar period until his death 
The title of an extensive interview which he gave in 1981 to two reporters, 
published shortly before his death under the title of The Committed 
Observer,2 captured his life as an action-oriented writer and scholar 
His life as a critic and editorialist was, as Pierre Hassner suggests, one 
with his scholarly work and philosophical disposition Read as a whole, 
even works which Aron felt were of a lesser theoretical interest and 
importance, like The Great Schism and The Century of Total War, assume 
considerable stature as keys to his philosophy of history and his 
understanding of the principal sources of interstate conflicts These 
commentaries as well as a host of seemingly time-bound and time-urgent 
studies furnished a vehicle for theoretical lucidity and insight, qualities 
that, as Hassner argues, tended to escape Aron in those works, like The 
Introduction to the Philosophy of History, which Aron expressly cast m
theoretical terms It is not surprising then that those critics who hold
4him to a rigorous scholarly test, as Urs Luterbacher does below find many 
of the same weaknesses in Aron’s disciplinary writing that Aron himself was 
ready to concede —  but perhaps too quickly if Hassner is right
Third, and aside from obvious space limitations, a comprehensive 
review of Aron's works is beyond the scope of our interest We are 
interested primarily m  what Aron has to tell us about the study of 
international relations Aron almost singlehandedly created this field in 
postwar France He separated it from the formal study of history and 
philosophy and, with the realists, assigned international relations its own 
object of study the behavior of soldiers and diplomats as representatives 
of nation-states which were the principal actors of the emerging global 
community and, by implication, the proper unit of analysis of the system
If the only reasons to look again at Aron were simply historical —  as 
a purported realist theorist and as a leader m  French and continental 
thinking —  a question might well be raised about devoting a symposium, 
even one of such modest proportions, to him i Several considerations prompt 
the conclusion that there is more than meets the eye about Aron's 
contribution to international relations than a narrow reading of only those 
works, like Peace and War or The Great Debate, which he designated as 
studies in international relations or nuclear strategy Aron invariably 
asked important questions about politics The essays by Hassner Hoffmann 
and Luterbacher and the divergent views they have about Aron's approach and 
significance for international relations study provide prima facie evidence 
of his talent for raising questions of enduring importance On this point, 
of Aron as questioner, all three agree that he stood above his peers What 
they dispute are his answers —  or, more to the point, his resistance to
5closure on the questions he posed Three are of special concern to 
students of international relations the scope of the field, the 
appropriate methods and concepts of analysis, particularly the claims of 
international relations as a science, and the role of war, i e , of force 
and coercive threats, in establishing an ordered and legitimate 
international community
The Scope of International Relations
Aron's attempt at precision in Peace and War is initially misleading 
as a guide for his conception of international relations His narrow focus 
on strategic-diplomatic activity, principally on the persistent threat of 
war in interstate relations, seemingly placed him squarely in the realist 
camp By that toicen he opened himself immediately to the criticism of 
traditional liberals, following the teachings of Adam Smith, John Stuart 
Mill, David Ricardo, Norman Angeli and Woodrow Wilson, who deplored power 
politics both as an adequate description and explanation of human progress 
and as a guide for state policy They imputed to industrialization and 
modernization a progressive economic interdependence among people across 
state frontiers that, if left unmolested by war or what were perceived as 
outdated dynastic or imperialistic struggles for hegemony, would usher in 
an era of peace and prosperity Aron's thinking also stood apart from 
present-day functionalists, like David Mitrany or neo-functionalists like 
Joseph Nye, who, while sensitive to power considerations, prefer to 
emphasize the cooperative and non-lethal competitive features of 
international relations as the dominant characteristics and future
tendencies of the system
6Aron's seeming realist position, not unlike those of liberal 
counterparts, also took issue with Marxist-Leninist presumptions about the 
deterministic implications of the modes of economic production, the 
political dominance of those groups in control of these productive means, 
and the inevitable class struggle arising from a globalized commerce and 
industrialization, initially under the direction of a small group of 
capitalists A Marxist-Leninist persuasion views international relations 
as a clash of classes, not states Its core is class conflict in which the 
state is the object, not subject, of the struggle The state is the 
principal coercive instrument of capitalists seeking to maintain their 
power within each nation and the preferred instrument by which to conduct 
their global competition, resulting in the spread of imperialism and m  the 
outbreak of global war
What Hassner and Hoffmann make clear is Aron's broad conception of the 
scope of international relations, one must look beyond Aron's formal 
writings on international relations to appreciate his emphasis on 
strategic-diplomatic behavior as a point of departure and not as an end 
point for a more elaborate and inclusive understanding of interstate 
relations It was a critical starting point since a regime of power, based 
on organized violence, established a provisional order for the system It 
did not follow from this assumption that socio-economic forces and ideology 
were irrelevant or could be disregarded in any attempt to describe 
accurately or to explain fully the behavior of the soldier or the diplomat 
and the outcomes of state power struggles Aron's quarrel with liberals, 
functionalists, and Marxists and their contemporary offsprings is not over 
the significance for interstate conflict and cooperation of new means to
7produce wealth or of scientific discovery and technological innovation as 
complements of man's genius for tool making and fabrication Aron 
understands these varied features of man's striving as efforts to control 
and refashion physical nature —  and himself in the process If the 
admittedly sprawling, uncodified, and unsystematic character of Aron's 
works is viewed for thematic unity as a whole, it is clear that these 
economic material factors, broadly conceived, enjoy a critical place in 
Aron's analysis of interstate relations In this regard, he breaks ranks 
with realist thinkers whose inclination to reduce everything to a power is 
as exasperating to serious analysis as is the penchant of Marxists to 
explain war, imperialism, authoritarian rule, and alienation solely in 
economic terms
For Aron, as Hassner makes clear, world politics is framed by three, 
independently evolving systemic, i e community-wide, processes of change 
the traditional strategic-diplomatic struggle of states, the 
industrialization of the world system, and the rise of new secular 
religions claiming universal validity and demanding unswerving allegiance 
These processes form three separate logics driving the relations of states 
Economic activity, however important, does not by itself create a regime of 
power that authoritatively allocates values among peoples and states In 
keeping with realist writers (and practitioners like Charles de Gaulle), 
the state, as a repository and source of legitimate political action and, 
following Weber and Hobbes, as a monopolist of violence and coercion, is 
for Aron the central object of study Its capacity for arbitrating 
domestic differences and especially its reliance of war to resolve 
conflicts between polities mark it as the central actor in international
8relations Unlike other realists however, Aron identified 
industrialization and interdependent economic activity as separate sources 
of interstate conduct —  and also of conflict and war Similarly, he was 
adamant in underlying the importance of ideology —  defined as secular 
religions —  as a third process of change These processes of change often 
have decisive impact on the agents of the state —  military establishments 
and foreign offices On these points he parts company with realists and 
Marxists and their splinter groups
His experience with Nazism and Fascism confirmed three underlying 
assumptions of his theoretical grasp of international relations While he 
underscored the appeal to violence as the unique feature of interstate 
relations, he was equally insistent on the importance of domestic regimes 
as a critical explanatory variable of international conduct This key 
assumption —  a potentially testable proposition after the fashion of 
Rudolph Rummel's research —  linked the study of comparative politics and 
international relations Although Aron never pursued the full implications 
of this connection, he built a bridge that remains to be crossed by many 
analysts today whose hesitancy and parochialism slows the potential 
cross-fertilizations between these sub-disciplines of political science 
Again, Aron may well have been his own worst enemy in obscuring this 
connection in his conscious writing on international relations which was 
explicated in the larger corpus of his work In distinguishing so sharply 
between domestic and foreign affairs, Aron was not arguing the irrelevance 
of domestic regimes and ideologies on international relations, as many of 
his critics are quick to argue He was instead isolating and accenting the 
most important and obvious, but still widely overlooked or slighted,
9characteristic of interstate rivalry —  war —  while stressing the role of 
economic conflict and ideology as causes of war
An interest m  regimes, prompted by the rise of Hitler's Germany which 
could neither have been foreseen nor extrapolated from a straightforward 
realist approach to state conflict, confirmed his commitment to a study of 
international relations as the study of history (as man's capacity for 
artful and artificial construction of political forms and rules to order 
human activity) and, by extension, as the pursuit of moral philosophy (as a 
search, given birth by the Greeks and sustained by the Enlightenment's 
faith in reason, for right conduct m  public affairs or for the ideal 
society) What to study in explaining the behavior of states was given by 
historical actors —  not analysts —  and by the moral framework that 
paradoxically bound them to their age —  their Weltanschauung —  and 
opened them to the possibilities, not inevitability, of perfection For 
Aron, while international relations is certainly a disciplinary study 
requiring rigorous and systematic analysis, it is something more It 
should provide reliable knowledge about how men can and should act to 
create an ordered and legitimate world society while combating those who 
would qualify, arrest, or destroy an open society, as the expression of 
human freedom and creativity and as both the precondition and instrument of 
the pursuit of knowledge about men, their political institutions and their
prospects
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International Relations as Science and Moral Conduct
Aron's fundamentally moral approach to international relations placed 
him m  good company, with such greats as Emmanuel Kant and Quincy Wright 
His refusal to be classified only as a realist raises the second important 
reason for a close re-examination of Aron It is here where Stanley 
Hoffmann and Urs Luterbacher join the issue Luterbacher argues that Aron 
was instrumental in turning French and continental attention and energies 
from the scientific study of international relations Aron turned away 
from an emerging scientific approach to political study, symbolized by 
Antoine Condorcet and Augustin Cournot, for a philosophical stance, 
putatively shaped decisively by German historians, that precluded need for 
general principles of explanation of social and political behavior, a 
logical necessity if one wants to adopt a scientific conception This 
same quality is considered a virtue by Hoffmann who contends that Aron 
taught us the futility of prophecy, the impossibility of grasping the 
whole of reality, the role of events and accidents Who is right and why 
should we care7
Hassner provide a preliminary answer His analysis of Aron's writing 
also exposes dimensions of the scientific-humanistic debate in Aron's 
thinking that merit further study and reflection On the one hand, Aron 
as Hassner suggests, was no less interested than any social scientist in 
generalization What distinguishes him from his contemporaries is the 
sweep and comprehensiveness of the generalizations he sought He was not 
given to simple and narrow hypothesis testing He had little patience and 
less interest in a value-free social science His identification of
11
independent sources of interstate conflict has by no means been submitted 
to serious and conclusive analysis Yet the empirical and normative claims 
of the current schools of international relations, identified earlier 
require the explicit rejection of Aron's position He refused to choose 
between history and science or between the engaged scholar and the freedom 
and independence of reason He could therefore accept necessity m  history 
—  or at least concede probabilistic causation —  and affirm the 
fundamentally contingent character of historical experience that is framed, 
but not determined, by the conjunctural play of global, systemic forces 
He may be faulted for not having done enough to show how these forces 
interact, but he cannot be accused of having ignored them or of having 
failed to identify them for other students and practitioners
There is still a deeper level that needs probing the independence 
and self-sufficiency of a scientific study of politics and international 
behavior Aron's reservations are three-fold For Aron, a philosophy of 
social science, patterned after the physical sciences, could not justify 
itself since it rested on value-free assumptions This epistemological 
weakness might well be dismissed, as it tends to be m  Anglo-American 
scholarship, on utilitarian or pragmatic grounds, but for the historical 
experience of the twentieth century Aron's second reservation was rooted 
in the rise of Fascism, Nazism, and Communism which were enemies of the 
kind of liberal, democratic society urged by Luterbacher as the 
precondition for scientific inquiry According to Aron, liberal societies 
could not be indifferent to the use of force to protect themselves at home 
or abroad This condition was for Aron as much a hypothesis subject to 
scientific investigation as a guide for action —  praxis in Aron's terms
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Finally, new values, aggressively spread by secular religions (and 
today by the resurgence of religious fanaticism), limit the possibilities 
of scientific social science and threaten its independence The creation 
of new values, many by no means constructive or favorable to peace, sets 
social activity apart from physical phenomena and imposes limits on 
international relations as a purely value-free pursuit
War and International Relations
Aron’s concern with the role of war m  international relations also 
deserves notice Aron was among the first to recognize the stabilizing 
impact of nuclear weapons on the superpower balance and its paradoxical 
de-stabilizmg effects on regional conflicts The heterogeneity of the 
international system generates sub-systemic rules of conflict and 
incentives for the threat or use of force that does not conform to the 
global superpower struggle Clausewitz, the focus of Aron’s mature years 
of analysis, still had relevance to explain the continued resort to war in 
revolutionary and interstate conflict despite the existence of nuclear 
weapons The decolonization experience and the regional dominance of North 
Vietnam in Southeast Asia, Israel in the Middle East, and India in South 
Asia owe much to the successful employment of force The optimistic 
assumption of functionalist and neo-functionalist theory, that of the 
progressive de-militarization of interstate competition, is belied by this 
experience and the continued expansion of military capabilities and arms 
production centers around the globe 3
War and the war machine, arising out of industrial development and 
technological innovation, held a particular fascination for Aron
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Globalized militarism threatened to overwhelm the nation-state struggle as 
it did temporarily and unexpectedly in World War I Like Schumpeter Aron 
tended to see the rise of a technocratic military elite and bureaucracy as 
a general phenomena of modernization The capacity to produce wealth and 
goods in abundance provided the wherewithal to sustain large and 
technically proficient military establishments which enjoyed increasing 
latitude in their impact on societies and on the allocation of resources 
World War I demonstrated that states were as much prisoners of the military 
as the latter was ostensibly an instrument of the state This condition 
was not a necessary characteristic of any particular political regime, as a 
Wilson or Lenin preferred to believe, but a general and ominous feature of 
contemporary international relations
The hyperbolic warfare of the twentieth century raised in Aron's mind 
the need to understand the major forces producing this unanticipated but 
potentially foreseeable crisis in international relations In his mind 
only an international relations of the scope and sweep of the system itself 
could yield a preliminary diagnosis of the grave ills within the global 
community that encouraged and unleashed worldwide conflict and devastating 
warfare Aron’s conception of crisis, therefore, contrasts sharply and 
fundamentally with much of current literature on the subject From his 
broad perspective, the rigorous analyses of crisis decision-making found, 
say, in Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing's Conflict among Nations^ and Graham 
Allison's Essence of Decision^ look at real or potential international 
crises from the wrong end of the telescope They are attempting to manage 
nation-state crises which raise the specter of global conflagration at a 
point in time when soldiers and diplomats risk being prisoners of events,
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and not their masters The study of crisis must be cast in systemic, not 
narrow bargaining, terms While the momentary significance of 
international crisis, conceived in bargaining terms, cannot be gainsaid, 
such an approach to international crises obscures the larger structural 
crises —  most especially the militarization of international relations —  
besetting the global system and all national leaders that give rise to 
eleventh hour bargaining to prevent a calamitous war A re-reading of Aron 
promises to refocus our research energies to identify the major sources of 
conflict inherent within the system as a precondition for devising 
strategies to manage and resolve them before war appears to be the only way
out —  albeit a no exit solution
r
Conclusion
Gertrude Stem, shortly before her death, reportedly asked Alice 
Toklas, her life-long friend, what were the answers to life's riddles 
Toklas replied that there were no answers Stein was supposed to have then 
rejoined What are the right questions7 In an age of competing 
certitudes —  ideological, political, strategic and scientific —  Aron 
never ceased raising questions about belief systems and their evidentiary 
claims —  and even about the validity of the questions he posed This 
habit of mind, first given voice by Socrates in Plato's Republic, animated 
his concern for explaining why men and political communities behave the way 
they do and how they might or should act As students of politics, we owe 
Aron much for asking the right question, for resisting early closure, and
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for keeping the search for better answers open, free, and wide both as a 
student and practitioner of politics —  always the committed observer
Edward A Kolodziej 
University of Illinois
